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THE MYTH OF CONSENTING ADULTS: THE NEW 
SEXUAL ASSAULT PROVISIONS
Gayle MacDonald and Karen Gallagher*
The Canadian government has recently (15 August 1992) passed Bill C-491 which 
revised the sexual assault provision of the Criminal Code.2 This legislation is in 
response to the Supreme Court of Canada’s 7-2 decision3 to strike down s. 276 of 
the Criminal Code, which had limited the court in questioning victims of sexual 
assault as to past sexual history, and thus violated the accused’s CharterA rights. 
As indicated in the rationale for this legislation, the new provisions in the sexual 
assault bill were drafted “... to promote and help to ensure the full protection of 
rights guaranteed under sections 7 and 15 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and 
Freedoms'’; “... to encourage the reporting of incidents of sexual violence or 
abuse...”; and to reinforce the idea that the Parliament of Canada believes that the 
admission of the complainant’s sexual history as evidence “... should be subject to 
particular scrutiny, bearing in mind the inherently prejudicial character of such 
evidence.”5
The most important feature of this legislation, however, is a definition of what 
constitutes “consent” in a sexual assault case. The Criminal Code now defines 
consent in s. 273.1(1) as “... the voluntary agreement of the complainant to engage 
in the sexual activity in question.” As well, s. 273.1(2) states that no consent is 
obtained where:
(a) the agreement is expressed by the words or conduct of a person other than the
complainant;
(b) the complainant is incapable of consenting to the activity;
(c) the accused induces the complainant to engage in the activity by abusing a
position of trust, power or authority;
(d) the complainant expresses, by words or conduct, a lack of agreement to engage
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in the activity; or
(e) the complainant, having consented to engage in sexual activity, expresses, by 
words or conduct, a lack of agreement to continue to engage in the activity.
Women’s groups have interpreted these changes as a formal endorsement of 
the populist “no means no” phrase on sexual assault.6 The Act cautions men and 
women to ensure that consent is received, and that consent is agreed upon prior 
to any sexual activity. At first blush these revisions look like an empowering tool 
for the victims of sexual assault. The Act will require a man to obtain consent 
from a woman prior to sexual activity, rather than assuming that the woman 
consents to the activity. The concept of consent as an agreement to be reached, 
rather than an assumption of interaction, reflects the sexual power imbalance 
between men and women. However, as useful as these new provisions may look, 
they are not without their problems.
The following will discuss of the new consent provisions within the context of 
both sociological and juridical feminist theory, with special attention to the 
implications these provisions have for women as victims in sexual assault cases.
Feminist Theory and Law
Feminist theorizing in jurisprudence has long emphasized the fundamental 
patriarchal structure of legal praxis, and the potential dangers such a structure has 
for women.7 There are those who argue that the patriarchal structure of law may 
also obscure class and race differences.8 The structure of criminal law, however, 
is systemically patriarchal.9 This means that this structure is based on hierarchy, 
power, authority and absolute rules. Criminal law is based on rational, deductive
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logic, with great appeal to objective and impartial thought.10
Law identifies, according to Naffine, a legal person as “... a middle-class man 
who demonstrates ... a form of ‘emphasised’ middle-class masculinity.”11 Women, 
although marginally accepted in society and the workplace, have been specifically 
excluded from law’s legal ideal of a person. It can be argued justifiably that not 
all men are equal within the eyes of the law; for example, lower socio-economic 
class men experience discrimination and do not have the same privileges as do 
their upper-class counterparts. However, lower class men may still command the 
same “enjoyment” of a definition of sexuality as do other men.
Law and “The Body”
Law reproduces the concept of “woman”12 in a sexualized and subjugated form. 
In sexual assault cases a woman’s body becomes evidence in court. The victim is 
required to repeatedly verbalize her experience. The trauma of rape or sexual 
assault is relived each time she is asked to relate her experience, despite recent 
attempts to “understand” this trauma in juridical terms.13 Part of the problem 
with this procedure is that a woman’s sexuality is continually defined in terms of 
the male experience of sex. A man’s sexual pleasure “... is comprehended as the 
pleasure of the Phallus, and by extension the pleasures of penetration and 
intercourse... .”14
The Ethic of Care
More recent work in assessing the “feminizing” of law has been the application of 
the work of Carol Gilligan. Gilligan, a psychologist, in pointing out what she 
found as differences in the process of moral reasoning on the basis of sex, 
determined that the differences were due, in part, to what she termed the “ethic
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of care” component of female moral reasoning.15 Feminist legal scholars have 
determined that the “ethic of care” constitutes a missing element in legal thought.
For Gilligan, the “ethic of care,” is paradigmatically conceptualized as the 
female perspective on moral reasoning, or a “web.” This is contrasted with that 
of a “ladder” or the male perspective. The idea of a ladder is premised upon 
autonomy, independence, separateness and logical, rational methods of decision­
making. On the other hand, “the web is premised upon a conception of self as 
attached, interdependent, connected to other persons, and primarily relational.”16 
The web is a more cooperative and relational form of decision-making in law and 
morality.
Gilligan’s “ethic of care” involves a “different voice” of women which ties 
relationship and responsibility with the origins of aggression in the failure of 
connection. The central component of the ethic of care is “an awareness of the 
constitutive interconnection and interdependence of the self and other.”17
Compared with and contrasted to the male “rights-based” approach whereby 
men are aware of and advocate for their individual rights, the ethic of care 
approach involves community rights and concern for others as well as for oneself. 
What is problematic about the “ethic of care” used in feminist legal theory is its 
potential to essentialize the experience of women as fundamentally more “caring” 
and nurturing than the ethic of men.
These various precepts and the problems of sexual assault laws are related by 
three concepts: i) What constitutes a definition of sexuality, ii) Whether or not the 
female body has an integrity within legal reasoning, and iii) To what extent the 
possible “ethic of care” may operate to include women’s experience. All of these 
points surface when the question of whether or not a woman actually consented 
to sexual relations is raised. This issue has become the central point around which 
cases are often built. The new provisions on consent present a useful opportunity 
to analyze recent trends in the presentation of women’s sexuality in legal discourse. 
It is to these new provisions, then, that our focus now turns.
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Consent and Equality: Mutually Exclusive Concepts?
There is little doubt that the new sexual assault legislation is an improvement over 
the old. To have the onus of proving consent shifted to the alleged offender is, 
after all, the ideal for most feminist groups. In part, this is due to the fact that 
women’s groups have lobbied the Canadian government for a considerable amount 
of time to render “agreement” to sexual assault a logical absurdity -  one which 
furthers both the perception of male sexuality as uncontrollable and the perception 
of female sexuality as existing only for “access” by men.
Whether or not there was agreement has always been the question, so to 
speak, in criminal law pertaining to rape and sexual assault. The very concept of 
consent, however, implies an equality that simply does not exist. Consent is often 
constructed in criminal law as a contractual agreement, a form of compromise 
reached between two equal parties. What this reflects, of course, is the absurd 
assumption, both within criminal law and social context generally, that men and 
women are sexually equal in the social world.
There are two problems with this precept that we would like to address. The 
first is that of the presumption of equality. The second is that of consent. With 
regard to the first, the meaning of equality is entirely dependent upon its 
context.18 Equality can mean sameness, or treating people under the law in the 
same way. In criminal law, for example, this can be the assurance that two people 
receive the same sanction for drunk driving in two different provinces or 
jurisdictions. In fact, this interpretation was an initial one for s. 15 of the Charter.
But this Aristotelian notion is often distorted by interpretation to mean 
differences: treating two groups differently in order to achieve some sort of 
equality. Pay equity legislation could be considered an example of this principle. 
That is, an employer is obliged to pay wage differentials between two groups in 
order to ensure parity.
What both these concepts miss, of course, is the idea that the two parties in 
question are very often not equal at the door of the courtroom. Unlike the two 
parties agreeing to a contract in the earlier example, an alleged offender of sexual 
assault and an alleged victim are simply not “the same” in a court of law. Part of 
this has to do, one can easily argue, with the gender differences of the parties. 
Indeed, one can argue that male victims are taken more seriously than female
1SG.M. MacDonald, An Equality Analysis: Feminist Praxis and the Charter of Rights and Freedoms
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victims, both by the media and by the courts.19 One could also easily argue, as 
many have done, that the power differential between men and women is further 
replicated in the hierarchial manner in which sexual assault is presented in a court 
of law.
We think, however, that the issue here goes much deeper than this. We think 
it goes to the very concepts upon which law is based. We refer the reader here 
to a fascinating account of this thought.
In a recent publication, RA. Duff questions the role of both mens rea and 
actus reus as having fixed theoretical and philosophical bases in the practice of 
determining guilt.20 In other words, Duff argues that the concept of mens rea as 
well as the concept of actus reus are fundamentally based on an interpretive 
process that leads to competing frameworks within the courtroom. He argues that 
mens rea is based on intentionality and is subject to the interpretation of the 
behaviour of the alleged offender rather than an inference about their mental 
state. He also argues that there are two competing models of human agency, 
consequentialist and non-consequentialist, at work in the determination of guilt. 
The first is based on culpability — we hold someone responsible for an act when 
it is fair to do so. The second examines the standards of culpability which define 
the nature of the wrongdoing.
Donald Galloway, in a recent review, applauds Duffs unpacking of the 
interpretive nature of criminal law but critiques his accounting of the “role played 
by intention in the competing models of agency.”21 One of the more compelling 
examples given by Duff is an acceptance by the courts that an attempted criminal 
act is considered to be less serious than a “successful” crime. In other words, do 
attempted criminal acts differ substantially in intent from successfully completed 
criminal acts?
Galloway claims that Duff’s arguments surrounding intention and agency are 
not fully developed, as they do not move beyond negligence on the one hand, yet
19We have not researched this point carefully, but it occurs to us that the recent (within the past five 
years) spate of accusations of sexual molestation in training schools and orphanages across the 
country, have generated wide media attention for two reasons: many are horrified at the abuse of the 
young, whether they be female or male, but many more are titillated by the fact that these cases 
involved same-sex abuse. The only fact that has actually changed over time is public exposure. Many 
of the cases are 20 years or more old, and the perpetrators (no surprises here!) are white, 
heterosexual men.
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seem to have “a distinction without a difference” on the other. That is, the 
difference between the non-consequentialist, who recognizes the distinction 
between an intended action (acting in order to produce a result) and intentional 
action (acting despite the fact that a result will occur), and the consequential, 
who sees no difference between the two. Galloway uses this example to critique 
Duff as to the unexplained role of intention in his work.
We agree. Most of Duffs analysis on this point does not move beyond a 
liberal rationalist paradigm as an explanation of intention. Where Duff does shine, 
however, is in the most obvious example of his thesis, the crime of rape. He 
argues that an honest mistake of consent does not negate liability for rape.
We argue that responsibility for an action is what constitutes the reverse onus 
on consent in the new provisions. But do the provisions stand up to this test? 
Upon examining the wording of the new legislation, one can see that in s. 273.1 
consent is not assumed, particularly if the victim is unable to provide consent, has 
been coerced to provide consent, or changes her mind and indicates so. So far, 
so good. But in section 273.2(b), we discover that it is not a defence to a charge 
if “the accused did not take reasonable steps, in the circumstances known to the 
accused at the time, to ascertain that the complainant was consenting.”
The question arises, what are “reasonable steps”? Is there a possibility that 
the accused can convince the court that reasonable steps may also include that 
which to someone else constitutes an abuse of power? This is more than mere 
semantic nitpicking. We have very recent evidence that consent is still an 
ambiguous term.
In a recent Nova Scotia case involving a police officer, Judge Felix Cacchione 
found that, despite the fact the officer had sexual relations with a woman in his 
police cruiser, there was no evidence that the woman did not consent.22
This example denies the true meaning of consent, which is to agree freely to 
an action. This case implies, for example, that one of these authors could have 
sexual intercourse with a student in her classroom, and that it would be considered 
an act between consenting adults. Taken in the context of where and how this 
action occurred, one can easily understand that as the action took place in the 
police officer’s vehicle, it was an explicit exploitation of power as well as a breach 
of professional ethics. The police officer’s cruiser is not only a public vehicle, it
^ R  v. Levandier (24 December 1992) [unreported]. According to B. Dorey, “Dartmouth Cop 
Acquitted of Sexual Assault” The [Halifax] Chronicle Herald (26 December 1992), the judge weighed 
the evidence of the complainant that she was afraid of the accused because he was “an armed, 
uniformed police officer” against the evidence of the accused that the women initiated the sexual 
contact.
is a symbol of law and order. As taxpayers we do not want to see a vehicle 
explicitly intended for the purpose of enforcing the law and maintaining order to 
be used as a personal bedchamber by a police officer.
This brings us back to consent. Was there no understanding in this case of the 
power relationship between men and women regarding sexual activity? Was there, 
similarly, no understanding of the abuse of power? This decision demonstrates 
how the spirit of the law can be subordinated to the letter of the law. Although 
the case was decided under the old legislation, it is a clear illustration that in the 
realm of equality and consent, women still have a long, long way to go.
